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This paper focuses on the attempts of  U.S. agricultural interest groups to in- 
fluence the outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which was approved by Congress in November  1993. Agricultural issues have 
loomed large in world trade discussions since the earlier inception of the Uru- 
guay Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations in 
1986, and Canada and Mexico are important agricultural trade partners of the 
United States. For these reasons, the agricultural provisions of NAFTA became 
an important  component  of  the  agreement.  Moreover,  agricultural  interests 
played a crucial role in the passage of the NAFTA implementing legislation. 
They were able to win concessions that protect U.S. sugar from Mexican com- 
petition  and  provide  transition-period  protection  to winter fruits and  vege- 
tables, and that ensnared the United States in disputes about Canadian exports 
of wheat and peanut butter. With these concessions, the  trade liberalization 
achieved under NAFTA has resulted in little reform of  entrenched domestic 
agricultural  support  programs  in  the  United  States  (or Canada)  during  the 
lengthy tariff phaseout periods. 
To develop these points, the paper is organized as follows. A brief descrip- 
tion of US.  agricultural trade and support policies is provided, the approaches 
of the agricultural interest groups toward the negotiations  between  1990 and 
1992 are examined, and the provisions of the negotiated agreement and esti- 
mates  of  its  likely  impacts  are reviewed.  The focus then  turns  to the  side 
agreements negotiated by the administration of President Bill Clinton after the 
1992 elections, the activities of the agricultural interest groups during the con- 
David Orden is associate professor of agricultural and applied economics at Virginia Polytech- 
nic Institute and State University. 
The author thanks Barbara Craig, Carol Goodloe, and Anne Krueger and other conference parti- 
cipants for helpful comments. He is also indebted to the many participants in the NAFTA debate 
who shared their insights in interviews and other correspondence. 
71 72  David Orden 
gressional debate over the implementing legislation, and the final concessions 
offered to obtain support from agricultural interests. The concluding section 
addresses some issues raised by the NAFTA outcomes for agriculture. 
7.1  Diversity within Agriculture 
Agricultural production is only 3 percent of national output but is diffused 
among many diverse sectors. Grains and oilseeds account for one-fifth of the 
value of U.S. production, and livestock and poultry products for another one- 
fifth (International Trade Commission [ITC] 1993). A third group of commodi- 
ties, important in the NAFTA context, is made up of  horticultural products, 
and a final group are those commodities for which the United States has tradi- 
tionally imposed import quotas under Section 22 of  the Agricultural Adjust- 
ment Act of  1935 and its extensions (dairy products, cotton, peanuts, sugar and 
sugar-containing products).’ 
Grains and oilseeds are generally exported crops, while trade has been less 
important for livestock and poultry products and most fruits and vegetables (an 
exception is seasonal winter vegetables, for which imports have a 40 percent 
market share). Imports of dairy products, cotton, and peanuts have been re- 
stricted to less than 2 percent of domestic production, while sugar imports have 
fallen to 15 percent as domestic output has increased and corn sweeteners have 
captured a large share of the caloric sweeteners market. Less than 2 percent of 
dairy products are exported but exports account for more than 40 percent of 
U.S. cotton and 15 percent of the value of peanut production.* 
Domestic policy interventions provide high levels of support for some ex- 
port crops as well as for the Section 22 commodities (see, for example, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture [USDA] 1994). Support for export crops (including 
cotton) is provided through supply restrictions, direct payments to producers, 
floor prices (“loan rates”) for government-supported storage, and some export 
subsidies. Livestock and poultry generally receive few direct support payments 
and relatively low levels of protection. The support and protection levels have 
also been relatively low for most fruits and vegetables. 
Canada and Mexico are important to U.S. agricultural trade of a number of 
commodities. Canada produces over one-third of U.S. grain and oilseed im- 
ports( including essentially all imported wheat, barley, and soybeans. Canada 
also produces over 35 percent of  U.S. livestock and poultry imports, almost 
one-third of U.S. imports of peanuts and peanut products, and over one-fourth 
of imported sugar-containing products. Mexico produces over 90 percent of 
1. Section 22 authorizes trade restrictions when imports “render ineffective or materially inter- 
fere with” domestic supply-control and price-support programs of the U.S.  Department of Agri- 
culture. 
2. Dairy products are priced above world levels and are exported with subsidies. Peanut exports 
arise from a two-tier pricing scheme that allows sales at lower world price levels of US.  peanuts 
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imported winter fruits and vegetables and over 10  percent of livestock imports. 
Canada  and Mexico each account for over  15 percent  of the  value of  U.S. 
livestock  and  poultry  exports  and  Mexico  receives  over  one-third  of  U.S. 
dairy exports. 
7.2  Interest Group Approaches to the Negotiations 
When  the  Mexico-U.S.  free  trade  negotiations  were  announced  in  June 
1990, President Carlos Salinas and President George Bush articulated a broad 
mandate for reducing bilateral trade barriers and supporting Mexican reforms 
in agriculture and other sectors. Nevertheless,  there was considerable uncer- 
tainty about the extent to which agriculture would be included under the man- 
date for trade liberalization. This uncertainty was created in part by the high 
levels of protection provided to many commodities in Mexico and the United 
States. The subsequent entry of Canada into the negotiations added to the un- 
certainty,  since nontariff  trade  barriers  had  not  been  removed  in  the  1988 
Canada-U.S. trade agreement, as described by Miner (1993). Finally, the Uru- 
guay Round GATT negotiations, which had originally been scheduled to con- 
clude in 1990, remained deadlocked on agriculture. 
Faced with all this uncertainty, agricultural interest groups took active roles 
in seeking to shape the provisions of NAFTA. Among the supporters of rela- 
tively comprehensive liberalization were the American Farm Bureau Federa- 
tion, the National Corn Growers Association, numerous other grain, oilseed, 
and livestock associations, and many processing ind~stries.~ 
Opponents of  liberalization included the National Farmers  Union, wheat 
producers (raising concerns about transportation subsidies and the nontrans- 
parency of the pricing policies of the monopolistic Canadian Wheat Board), 
and protected peanut, sugar, and citrus and other winter fruit  and vegetable 
producers. A strong coalition emerged among the Florida sugar and fruit and 
vegetable interests. They developed a unified position with the Florida Farm 
Bureau and the Florida Cattlemen’s Association (both eventually broke ranks 
with their national organizations’ support for NAFTA), and the state commis- 
sioner of agriculture became an active proponent of their concerns. No similar 
coalition arose among the Section 22 commodities in general because the dairy 
and cotton sectors (with current or potential export interests in Mexico) re- 
mained less opposed than sugar and peanuts to trade liberalization on a bilat- 
eral basis. 
3. Descriptions of the positions and activities of the various interest groups are based largely on 
interviews with representatives of  twenty-two of the groups most involved in the negotiations and 
congressional deliberations, as well as with negotiators and others. These interviews were con- 
ducted between August and November 1993. Some initial evaluations of NAFTA by  representa- 
tives of  the agricultural interests are also summarized  in  the reports of  the Agricultural Trade 
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7.3  Agricultural Provisions of NAFTA 
High-level negotiators for Mexico and the United States agreed in February 
1992 that all agricultural products would be included in the long-run provisions 
for trade liberalization. Canada resisted participation in an agreement of such 
broad scope for agriculture. It agreed only to negotiate extension to Mexico of 
the limited provisions similar to those of the 1988 Canada-U.S. agreement. 
The negotiating parties  announced  that they had  reached a conclusion to 
their discussions in August. For Mexico and the United States, the agricultural 
tariff and market access provisions  called for the conversion of  all nontariff 
barriers to tariff-rate  quotas (TRQs). Under the TRQs, limited quantities of 
commodities  would receive  access under  low or zero duties, while imports 
above these quantities would be  subject to over-quota  tariffs  set to provide 
initial protection equivalent to the previous nontariff measures. The over-quota 
tariffs were to be phased out over adjustment periods of ten to fifteen years 
(see U.S. House of Representatives 1993). 
The long-run NAFTA provisions for agriculture accomplished the basic ob- 
jectives with respect to trade barriers of the broader  1987 U.S. “zero-option’’ 
GATT proposal for elimination of  trade-distorting border measures and sup- 
port policies. This result led Hufbauer and Schott (1993), for example, to con- 
clude that there was “laudable progress in the liberalization of farm trade bar- 
riers.” 
One cannot be as sanguine about the short-run NAFTA provisions for agri- 
culture. For the commodities protected by import quotas or licenses, market 
access levels under the initial TRQs were based on 1989 to 1991 trade quanti- 
ties and were scheduled to increase at only a 3 percent annual compound rate. 
Over-quota tariffs provided high levels of protection against additional imports 
in the short and medium run. Corn, dry edible beans, milk powder, and peanuts 
were considered particularly sensitive commodities and received fifteen-year 
adjustment periods. 
Intense  negotiations  also  focused  on  complex protective  TRQ transition 
mechanisms for sugar: Mexico agreed to raise its external sugar tariff to the 
preexisting U.S.  over-quota  level by  the seventh year of  the  agreement and 
subsequently  gained  potentially  unlimited  access  to  the  U.S.  market  if  it 
achieved a net production  surplus. Special tariff  phaseout and TRQ mecha- 
nisms were also developed for citrus and other horticultural products. 
The influence of various producer groups on the negotiations is evident from 
the NAFTA transition  mechanisms  for agricultural trade. Within  the frame- 
work of long-run liberalization, likely gainers among US.  producers confront 
the  lengthy  adjustment  mechanisms  included  to  protect  Mexican  farmers. 
Import-competing U.S. commodities are provided with similar adjustment pro- 
tection. Given these provisions, the end constraint of complete tariff elimina- 
tion  is crucial  to the  assertion that the  negotiated  provisions accomplished 
long-run bilateral trade liberalization for agriculture. 75  Agriculture and NAFTA 
7.4  Estimated Impacts of the Agreement 
Among  the  quantitative  studies  of  the  long-run  effects  of  NAFTA  on 
Mexican-US. agricultural trade, Grennes and Krissoff  (1 993) estimated that 
U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico (primarily grains, oilseeds, and livestock 
products) would increase by  $485 million  annually, and agricultural imports 
from Mexico by  $164 million  (primarily horticultural commodities  and live 
cattle). The USDA Office of Economics (1993) asserted a more positive view 
of NAFTA’s potentially beneficial impacts. Incorporating projected demand ef- 
fects resulting from an increase due to NAFTA of  0.5 percent in Mexico’s 
annual economic  growth, the  USDA  concluded  that  agricultural exports to 
Mexico were likely to be more than $2.5 billion higher annually with NAFTA 
by the end of the fifteen-year adjustment period, while imports of agricultural 
products from Mexico would increase by $500 to $600 million. 
7.5  Side Agreements and Implementing Legislation 
After  the  November  1992 election,  the  Clinton  administration  followed 
through  on its campaign pledge to negotiate supplemental (side) agreements 
with respect to the environment, labor, and import surges. The change in ad- 
ministration gave the agricultural commodity groups that had sought limits on 
NAFTA’s  trade-liberalizing  provisions  the opportunity for a second hearing. 
In particular, the concerns of the sugar producers were acknowledged by the 
designated United States trade representative,  Mickey Kantor. As early as his 
January 1993  preconfirmation hearings, he pointed out that the side agreement 
on import surges would “affect agriculture and particularly be protective, we 
hope, of the sugar industry” (U.S. Senate 1993). Despite such assurances, the 
side agreement on import surges that was negotiated by the Clinton administra- 
tion  did not achieve the types  of  changes  in  the initial NAFTA provisions 
sought by some agricultural producer groups. 
Faced with growing opposition, President Clinton used a September 1993 
signing ceremony for the side agreements to launch an intense campaign for 
passage by Congress of implementing legislation for NAFTA. Agricultural in- 
terest groups played an active role in the ensuing congressional debate. 
Among  supporters  of  the  agreement,  an  umbrella  support  organization 
called Ag for NAFTA was formed and eventually claimed over 140 member 
organizations. In addition, the American Farm  Bureau Federation and many 
of the specific commodity associations devoted staff and resources to support 
passage of the implementing legislation. However, the scale of their activities 
was relatively  modest compared to the widespread efforts among interested 
parties (see, for example, Grayson 1993). Ag for NAFTA had an initial budget 
of about $10,000 and its final budget for publicity, advertising, and other ex- 
penses was less than $100,000. 
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proaches to the implementing legislation based on the particular circumstances 
of each sector. The National Milk Producers Federation adopted a position of 
support for the agreement during the summer of  1993 and the National Cotton 
Council of America endorsed NAFTA in October. 
Opponents Qf  NAFTA also continued to mobilize around the implementing 
legislation. The National Farmers Union  made defeat of  NAFTA one of  its 
top priorities and was a founding member of  the opponents’ Citizens Trade 
Campaign. While not formally aligned with third-party  presidential  aspirant 
Ross Perot, who was an active NAFTA opponent, representatives of the farm- 
ers union  believed  he  had  reduced  the  prospects  for the  approval  of  the 
agreement. 
Among specific commodity groups opposing the agreement, wheat produc- 
ers continued their break with the other export-oriented grains and held out for 
resolution of the issues of Canadian transportation subsidies and Wheat Board 
price t~ansparency.~  In exchange for their support for NAFTA, the wheat pro- 
ducers sought emergency action under Section 22. This would have allowed 
the Clinton administration to impose immediate quotas or tariffs on grain im- 
ported from Canada rather than await the outcome of an investigation and rul- 
ing by the ITC. 
Peanut and sugar producer groups also remained opposed to the NAFTA 
provisions.  The  sugar  producers  sought  two  modifications  of  the  initial 
agreement: inclusion of corn sweeteners in determining the balance of produc- 
tion and consumption affecting Mexican access to the U.S. sugar market and 
a ceiling on Mexico’s access for the full fifteen-year adjustment period. The 
sugar producers lobbied the USDA and the Office of the U.S. Trade Represen- 
tative (USTR) and pressed their case through the Senate sweeteners caucus. 
They  viewed  the  USTR  as  sympathetic  to  their  interests  but  nevertheless 
committed  $500,000 to a campaign  to  “go hell  bent  to defeat NAFTA’ if 
the agreement was not revised. Their demands, of course, brought into sharp 
focus the competing interests of different commodity groups within U.S. agri- 
culture, as well as the relative strength of the Mexican and U.S. negotiating po- 
sitions. 
The Florida coalition, working along commodity lines and through the uni- 
fied position among agricultural groups within the state, also pressed for fur- 
ther accommodations for sugar, citrus, and other winter fruits and vegetables. 
The Florida agricultural producers, worked closely with the state’s congres- 
sional delegation of ten Democrats and thirteen Republicans, which through- 
out the congressional deliberations almost entirely remained on record as op- 
posed to the agreement. 
4. While the wheat growers were clamoring about Canadian policies, the flow of  wheat into the 
United States resulted as much from the U.S.  export subsidies discussed by  Bruce Gardner in 
chapter 6 of this volume. 77  Agriculture and NAFTA 
7.6  End Game Concessions 
With the fate of NAFTA uncertain as the November  17 vote in the House of 
Representatives  approached,  the  agricultural commodity  groups  were  posi- 
tioned to win various concessions. Unlike organized labor and others commit- 
ted to the defeat of the agreement, most of the agricultural commodity groups 
had limited their opposition to specific provisions. Moreover, a relatively large 
number of congressional votes rested at least in part on satisfying the concerns 
of the agricultural producers. 
The end game exploded into public view in early November. Concessions 
obtained for agriculture in the last two weeks of the debate are summarized in 
table 7.1. 
7.6.1  Initial Concessions 
An initial November 3 letter from the U.S. trade representative to Mexico’s 
secretary of  commerce indicated that the United States would seek a mutual 
agreement on accelerated tariff reductions for wine and brandy (USTR 1993). 
A second and more significant letter confirmed the USTR’s understanding that 
the two parties had recognized that substitution of corn syrup for sugar could 
“result in effects not intended by either Party” and therefore agreed that con- 
sumption of  corn syrup would be included in the determination of  Mexico’s 
net production surplus. The letter also indicated that notwithstanding previous 
provisions, Mexican sugar sales in the United States under NAFTA would be 
capped at 250,000 metric tons  through  a fifteen-year  adjustment period.  In 
short, Mexico had conceded to the demands of the U.S. sugar producers. Sub- 
sequently, the sugar industry indicated that it had withdrawn its opposition to 
NAFTA, a decision expected to influence at least a dozen votes in the House 
of Representatives. 
A third letter between the U.S. and Mexican negotiators addressed the issues 
raised by the Florida citrus industry. It specified an explicit price-based tariff 
snapback for citrus. Under the snapback, the United States would apply the 
prevailing most-favored-nation (MFN) rate of duty on imports from Mexico in 
excess of  specific quantities if the price of  fresh concentrated  orange juice 
dropped below an average based on the preceding five years for five consecu- 
tive days. 
In addition to this modest change from the original NAFTA text, the citrus 
producers had bargained for several other concessions: that tariffs on all forms 
of fresh and processed citrus products would receive the minimum 15 percent 
cut under  the  still-pending Uruguay  Round  GATT, that non-NAFTA  citrus 
juices would be reclassified as perishable commodities under U.S. law (expe- 
diting future injury claims by the industry), and that foreign citrus products 
would not receive additional special status under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) or the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The board of direc- 78  David Orden 









United States to seek mutual agreement to accelerated tariff reductions 
Consumption of corn sweeteners included in the determination of net production surplus 
Mexican TRQ capped at 250,000 metric tons for the seventh through fourteenth years of 
the agreement 
Most-favored-nation rate of duty on imports from Mexico in excess of 70 million gallons 
annually through 2002 (90 million gallons during 2003-2007)  if  the price of  fresh 
concentrated orange juice drops below an average based on the preceding five years for 
five consecutive days 
GATT tariff cuts on fresh and processed citrus products limited to  IS percent 
Non-NAFTA citrus juices  to  be  reclassified  as  perishable  commodities  to  expedite 
Citrus products not to receive additional special status under the GSP or the CBI 
Early warning import-surge mechanism 
GATT tariff cuts limited to IS percent on tomatoes, peppers, lettuce, cucumbers, celery, 
Sensitive products not to receive additional special status under the GSP or the CBI 
Postponement of decertification of methyl bromide for use as a soil fumigant until 2000 
Funding for soil and postharvest fumigant research; completion and  funding for US. 
Doubled purchases of fresh tomatoes and new purchases of sweet corn for school lunch 
Trade representative assurance of effective price-based and volume-based tariff snapback 
End-use certificates to prevent subsidized reexport of Canadian wheat and barley 
Bilateral consultations to address transportation  subsidies and Canadian Wheat Board 
pricing  practices  and  an  ITC  investigation  of  whether  imports  interfere  with  the 
domestic wheat program within sixty days unless the consultations were successful 
Bilateral consultations  to address the increase in  imports of  peanut  buttdpaste from 
Canada and an ITC investigation of whether imports interfere with the domestic peanut 
program within sixty days unless the consultations were successful 
Secretary of agriculture assurance to work vigorously to limit the volume of imports from 
Canada 
injury claims 
and sweet corn 
Horticultural Research Station, Fort Pierce, Florida 
programs 
provisions for fresh tomatoes and peppers 
Commissioner of  customs  assurance of  at least ten investigations and  350 positions, 
including 100 new hires, to enforce rules of origin 
tors  of  Florida  Citrus  Mutual  voted  to  withdraw  their  opposition  to  the 
agreement on November 10 based on these concessions. 
As the anti-NAFTA Florida coalition collapsed, other Florida fruit and vege- 
table producers also sought accommodations. The administration agreed to a 
range of  concessions that included the use of  an early warning import-surge 
mechanism; limits for certain commodities with respect to GATT, the GSP, and 
the CBI similar to those offered for citrus; an environmentally  controversial 
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funding  for  research  on  soil  treatment  and postharvest  fumigation;  and  an 
agreement to increase purchases of fresh tomatoes and sweet corn for school 
lunch  programs. The board  of  directors  of the  Florida  Fruit  and Vegetable 
Association withdrew its opposition to NAFTA on November  11. 
7.6.2  Final Deals 
Passage of the implementing legislation remained uncertain less than a week 
before the scheduled congressional vote, so the administration and its support- 
ers could not relax their efforts. Ag for NAFTA brought fifty to sixty leaders 
of various member organizations to Washington to lobby, but the real action 
was with the groups that had been or remained opposed to NAFTA. 
The wheat producers engaged in tense late-deal bargaining. Their hope for 
emergency Section 22 quotas or tariffs was scuttled when, by several accounts, 
the administration determined that they could not influence many votes. On 
November 15, however, the president agreed to partially accommodate the pro- 
ducers: he asked that the ITC investigate whether imports from Canada were 
interfering with U.S. wheat support programs,  unless  there  were  successful 
bilateral negotiations on Canadian policies within sixty days. With this conces- 
sion, the National Association of Wheat Growers announced, less than thirty- 
six hours before the House vote, that it would “now work for congressional 
approval  of  NAFTA.”  Five  congressmen  cited  the  Wheat  Growers’ 
position in support of their final decisions to vote for the implementing legis- 
lation. 
One of these representatives,  Representative Glenn English, was also con- 
cerned  about  illegal  transshipment  of  peanuts  and  beef  through  Mexico. 
To  address  the  continuing  opposition  to NAFTA by  peanut  producers  and 
English’s concerns,  the  president  committed  the  administration  to bilateral 
consultations on imports of peanut butter from Canada and to a second ITC 
investigation within sixty days if necessary. English was assured by the com- 
missioner of  customs that there would be “at least ten  visits to agricultural 
processing sites in Mexico,” and that “350 positions, including 100 newly hired 
employees,” would be assigned to enforce the NAFTA rules of origin. 
Final critical decisions were made by the Florida congressional delegation, 
which held a closed-door meeting on November  16. Although there may al- 
ready have been several closet votes for NAFTA, an Associated Press poll had 
counted only five of the twenty-three members of the delegation as supporting 
or leaning toward supporting the agreement on the previous day. A pivotal se- 
nior member of  the Florida delegation was Representative Tom Lewis, who 
served on the House Committee on Agriculture. To assure Lewis about his 
concerns  required  an  additional letter  from Mickey  Kantor  specifying  that 
NAFTA contained “effective price and volume-based  snapback provisions to 
deal with  increased imports  of  fresh tomatoes  and peppers.”  The next  day, 
Lewis and twelve other members of the Florida delegation voted with the ad- 80  David Orden 
ministration. The NAFTA implementing  legislation  passed  in  the House of 
Representatives by a 234 to 200 rnaj~rity.~ 
7.7  Conclusions from the NAFTA Outcomes 
In drawing inferences about the political economy of trade protection on the 
basis of the influence of U.S. agricultural groups on the NAFTA negotiations 
and implementing legislation, a crucial issue is the extent to which a mecha- 
nism was provided for overcoming established protection among agricultural 
sectors and expanding international markets. The decision to seek long-run 
liberalization of Mexican-U.S. agricultural trade under NAFTA established a 
strong objective compared to the limited provisions for agriculture in previous 
bilateral  trade  agreements  and  the  significant  weakening  of  the U.S.  zero- 
option proposal in the Uruguay-Round GATT negotiatiom6 The subsequent 
NAFTA provisions  for long-run trade liberalization remained  largely intact 
even with the grueling congressional debate. Many of the concessions offered 
to U.S. agricultural interest groups weaken the NAFTA transition-period pro- 
visions only marginally, and other acknowledged concessions to the interest 
groups are also relatively minor. 
This said, the notion that a trade agreement can serve as an avenue for re- 
form of  entrenched domestic U.S. agricultural programs fared poorly  under 
NAFTA. Among the protected  U.S. commodities, dairy and cotton came to 
support the Mexican-U.S. agreement only when  strong rules of  origin were 
adopted and the absence of any threat to their domestic markets became appar- 
ent. Peanut producers fought hard against the agreement and battled in the end 
for several concessions to sustain their protection. 
More egregious than the dairy, cotton, and peanut provisions, NAFTA ini- 
tially created a trade-diverting common sugar market between Mexico and the 
United States. The subsequent concessions to U.S. sugar interests exacerbated 
5. In addition to the confirmed concessions, there were rumors in the press that the administra- 
tion would back away from its intention to raise grazing fees on federal lands and that the proposed 
increase in the cigarette tax to finance health care reform might be  scaled back in exchange for 
support for NAFTA (Wall Street Journal  1993a. 1993b). A possible deal that did not seem to be 
under consideration  (despite the importance of  the Florida delegation)  would  have  linked the 
NAFTA vote to stalled negotiations between the government and sugar and fruit and vegetable 
producers as they  sought an out-of-court settlement on a program to restore the Everglades by 
reducing agricultural runoff. Whatever the NAFTA deals, health care reform failed to come to a 
vote in the  103rd Congress and Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt withdrew his proposal to raise 
grazing fees in December 1994. 
6. The Uruguay Round GATT negotiations were finally concluded in December 1993 and Con- 
gress approved legislation implementing the agreement in December 1994. The final agreement 
for agriculture includes provisions for replacing quantitative restrictions, such as Section 22 quo- 
tas, with TRQs  and for lowering all tariffs  by  an  average of  36 percent  over six years. The 
agreement also reduces but does not eliminate export subsidies, and caps some domestic support 
payments to farmers. See Sanderson ( 1994) and International Agricultural Trade Research Consor- 
tium (1994) for further discussion. 81  Agriculture and NAFTA 
the initial distortion by essentially stealing from the Mexican producers some 
of  their potential market opportunity while enhancing the potential demand 
facing U.S. producers. The concessions obtained gutted the agreement for freer 
bilateral trade, albeit within a protected common market, for at least the next 
fifteen years. They also raise the question of whether the agreement to allow 
unrestricted trade in sugar between Mexico and the United States after fifteen 
years is ultimately credible. 
The differences in the NAFTA outcomes with Mexico compared to Canada 
are also telling. The U.S. export producer groups were successful with respect 
to Mexico, which has opened'itself to substantial reform of  its agricultural 
policies. Mexican agricultural producer groups that might have benefitted from 
a stronger agreement in terms of their own export opportunities had only lim- 
ited  countervailing power  against the pressure for concessions by  import- 
protected U.S. producers. To insure NAFTA's approval, the U.S. government 
succeeded in pressing these concessions on the Mexican government. 
With Canada the story is different. Throughout the NAFTA process, import- 
competing Canadian agricultural producers were more effective in defending 
their established protection than the Mexican producers. Canada's participation 
in NAFTA  was largely ignored in the United States except by  a few special 
interests. But to insure passage of  the implementing legislation, the Clinton 
administration made unilateral promises to several U.S. agricultural commod- 
ity groups about their perceived grievances over imports from Canada. Thus 
one outcome of  the process was that it prolonged the disputes between the 
United States and Canada over wheat, peanut butter, and other products. 
Given the focus on Mexico in the public NAFTA debate, the unresolved 
issues with Canada are a surprising outcome. Subsequent to NAFTA's  enact- 
ment, the United States offered to settle the agricultural trade disputes with 
Canada by  adopting bilateral free trade in  agricultural products. When this 
offer was declined, the United States reached a bilateral agreement with Can- 
ada for temporary trade restrictions on wheat and imposed a global TRQ on 
peanut butter in its final Uruguay Round GATT tariff schedule. Thus, post- 
NAFTA agricultural trade between Canada and the United States ends up more 
laded with barriers than before. 
On  a  somewhat  different theme, the  bargaining power  that  agricultural 
groups held toward the end of the NAFTA debate is striking. The agricultural 
interest groups were well positioned to bargain for concessions because they 
sought modifications  of  specific provisions  but  did  not  oppose the  entire 
agreement. The concerns of sugar, the Florida coalition, peanuts, or wheat mat- 
tered to the outcome of close to thirty congressional votes. 
The question that arises is why other groups didn't do more to put themselves 
in such a position. The concessions made to agriculture toward the end of the 
debate were not the only concessions offered by  the Clinton administration. 
One wonders, for example, why the Am-CIO didn't approach the president 82  David Orden 
with concerns about specific industries and seek additional transition-period 
protection  in  these  areas in  exchange  for  delivering  their  support  for  the 
agreement. One can imagine a very different coalition having been put together 
to pass the implementing legislation in such circumstances. Agricultural inter- 
ests could have found themselves irrelevant to the congressional vote, leaving 
the sugar and wheat producers to make their case elsewhere. Curiously, one 
doubts these parties to last-minute concessions were the intended beneficiaries 
of organized labor’s political efforts. 
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